gradually moved away from this idea, however, in favor of plans for a project which would offer human visitors what co-director David Harradine describes as a space in which to "properly, respectfully and carefully observe animals watching a performance and reflect and report back on what they've seen, whether it's the body language of a pig or a goat." 11 For Harradine: "humans do a really bad job of paying attention," and so the project was conceived as giving both the company 9 I discuss the idea of a non-oppositional relationship between difference and continuity in more philosophical detail at the end of my and a wider public the opportunity to attend to animals, as themselves, engaged in processes of attending, rather than as the mere objects of human observation.
In particular, Harradine implies, humans have become highly selective in our perception of human-animal commonality not least, perhaps, on account of the demanding new ethical responsibilities such a perception might raise. In this sense, it may be less a matter of how much attention humans pay to animals, and more about how attending is performed (or how attention itself is understood). The kind of attention that Sheep Pig Goat invites is not attention conventionally understood as an immobilizing gaze or a process of selection and exclusion. Rather, it is an expanded, bodily attention to animals that differs from the everyday insofar as it does not "turn away from what it has a material interest in not seeing." 12 As Fevered Sleep co-director Sam
Butler notes, it is not that humans are poor at attending to animals per se, but that they attend to some animals more closely than others in order to suit their own needs.
13
In order to go at least some way to allow the performance-based research to speak for itself, I would now like to invite readers to watch the company's film of the project first before reading on.
<EMBED SHEEP PIG GOAT FILM HERE>
Founded in 1996 by Harradine and Butler, Fevered Sleep has created over thirty different projects of which Sheep Pig Goat is not the first to engage with animality. As the company describe,
Sheep Pig Goat came "on the back of a number of projects where we've found ourselves in the presence of animals or we've somehow wanted their presence in our work." 14 An Infinite Line:
Brighton (2008), for instance, was "an exploration of and response to the quality of natural light in Brighton," a performance which featured a white spotted stallion, Phoenix, owned by the same handlers who provided the animals for Sheep Pig Goat. 15 But whilst the live horse who appeared in 12 Henri Bergson, "The Perception of Change" in Henri Bergson: Key Writings, edited by Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 303-27, quote on 309. 13 Butler notes: "There's a hierarchy around which animals are welcome in our houses and onto our laps and into our beds sometimes, and the ones that we feel an urgency around taking care of and really observing what their needs are and drawing comfort from, and so that relationship serves us, but because it serves us we therefore care for them; and then there are the other animals that we have a really close relationship with but for other reasons, and that is the other need that we have for them which is to do with eating meat or the desire I should say, to eat them. And so we have a relationship with them in different ways, or maybe most of us don't have a relationship with them and that's the point" features "a man dressed like… a polar bear" as he undertakes "a fragmented journey from the northern reaches of Europe, through Scotland, to the south of the UK."
17
As documented in the film, the first iteration of Sheep Pig Goat took place in March 2017, in a London warehouse trying to be as much like a barn as possible. The animals involved were chosen for their familiarity with human contact and were transported to the site from a farm in
Wales, along with their handlers, who supervised all aspects of the animals' participation in the project and were present for all of the encounters with the principle function of attending to the animals' welfare. They included three sheep, two female Tamworth pigs (who are kept by their handlers for breeding) and a group of four rescued goats (all adolescent males). 18 The human performers included a bass clarinetist, a viola player, a double bassist, a singer, and two contemporary dancers, all of whom the directors described as offering a kind of "toolbox" for the unknown requirements of the work to come: all expert improvisers, all expert non-verbal conversationalists, valued by the directors for their heightened competencies in relational attentiveness.
It has become commonplace to define a performance practice as "research" according to, amongst other things, the criteria of "questioning." Sheep Pig Goat does exactly this: both in terms of explicit research questions expressed in human verbal language, but also in the nonverbal and bodily forms of questioning it performs. Situated in a professional arts rather than an academic context, pre-show framing nevertheless took great care to manage audience expectations by making clear that what they were coming to see was a public staging of the research process itself, not an entertaining show or finished piece. The project framed itself as a use of performance to investigate a series of questions, including: "how well do humans see animals as they really are -not as we tell ourselves they are?;" and "what do animals perceive, when they perceive us?" The vexed question of anthropomorphism and to what extent we can know animals "as they really are" is something that I will return to. But for now, I want to emphasize the ways in which questions were a key part of how the encounters were structured. For Harradine, his and Butler's role in the project as co- anything a human might be doing. 24 The animals in Sheep Pig Goat were invited to be observers of the human performers on their own terms: an invitation which they often appeared to take up precisely by largely ignoring them. But if from one perspective "very little happened," it is also that a lot happened. And indeed, it is because such a multiplicity of happenings took place, that no single response has the power to sanction the meaning of the event as a whole. When we ask, "What happened?" the response must take the form of an addition rather than a reduction. And-and.
<INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE> What happened? Sheep Pig Goat was a demonstration of performance's epistemic force, a project that foregrounds performance as a mode of inquiry. But it was also a project from which the directors emerged speaking not of a contribution to knowledge but of an "abyss of ignorance." 25 It was a site of learning but it was also one of unlearning. Although, perhaps, having exited the paradigm of mastery, there is no reason why research might not be defined--as Despret suggests--as aiming to make the world more rather than less strange to us. From this perspective, Sheep Pig
Goat appears as one way to respond to Despret's call "to learn to encounter animals as if they were strangers, so as to unlearn all of the idiotic assumptions that have been made about them." 26 only observed a single encounter. In this context, for instance, the singer described what was for her "a moment of sheer accomplishment" likely unnoticed by most of the visitors when the sheep "were comfortable enough to turn away while we were making sounds… that was so significant."
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What happened? A radical indeterminacy that functioned not just as a screen for anthropocentric projections (moving unilaterally from us to them), but as a site of a two-way movement. There were multiple knowledges projected onto the animal; at times, a given voice intervened to put an end to doubt. One of the handlers says to a dancer: "The pig is making that noise, because she doesn't like you moving in between her and the other pig. She's barking because you're getting too close." But something moved in the other direction too. Such moments felt like a kind of progress. As potential markers of appearance rather than the animals' indifference to the Animals have been entertaining humans throughout the ages in circuses and zoos, entertainment by pets has overtaken the Internet, every pet is in a sense a performer for humans. We wanted to reverse the roles and offer the animals the position of the viewer. When it comes to performing and being interesting pets are superior to us in several ways. When a pet comes on stage, for example they instantly capture everyone's attention. So the inspiration for the performance was
really a "what if" we reversed the roles for a moment. Making this performance has enabled us to see the world from the pets' point of view and we are hoping to learn from them. And we also wanted to expand our audience across species.
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In the case of Juurak and Bailey, the transformative work is less focussed on the humans living alongside the "pets" and more focussed on their own perception as performance-makers: often using imitation as the starting point for embodied empathy and becoming with their particular animal audiences. This is no easy identification though. Given the different world their sensory powers performatively produce, it seems likely, as Jessica Ulrich suggests, that the cats and dogs are experiencing the performances by Juurak and Bailey "in many ways that are inaccessible for 30 Despret, What Would Animals Say, 17. 31 Juurak and Bailey's use of the term "pet" here, rather than Haraway's now widely used term "companion species," might be jarring for some. However, as the description here and interviews elsewhere suggest, the artists' practice very much aligns with the notion of domestication as reciprocal transformation that one finds in Haraway, rather than reasserting any species hierarchy that might be construed as intrinsic to the notion of animals as "pets." 32 Krõõt Juurak and Alex Bailey, "Q&A," available at http://www.performancesforpets.net/info.
responsiveness to the birds' themselves who have no choice (it seems) but to listen from their confinement. 37 If there has been an increase in artists making work for animal audiences, then there has simultaneously been a growth of interest in the possibility of using the arts to give humans the chance to experience what is framed as "the animal's point of view," including by animal rights organizations banking on the capacity of empathy to create behavioral change (despite others concerns for its long-term political efficacy). For example, PETA have launched a series of VR based works including I, Chicken (2014), a VR experience which they claim "allows people to view life from a chicken's perspective before being sent to slaughter," and I, Orca (2015), also specifically sold as an "empathy-building" project, which "uses wireless Google virtual reality goggles to immerse participants in a world where they can swim freely in the ocean with their orca process of learning to think with animals, rather than about them as objects--processes which may or may not proceed through methods of imitation or seeking to act "as if" one were that animal.
Furthermore, the unlearning and active forgetting of presumed knowledge is an important feature of this methodology. That is, for Despret, interspecies empathy involves both an unlearning of how to think according to pre-existing assumptions (in which knowledge about the animal is merely applied to it), and the experimental production of new modes of thought alongside animals, undertaken particularly--though not exclusively--through the body. 52 Conventionally anthropomorphism is understood as an intellectual, voluntary projection of the image of the human onto the animal, according to a kind of fantasy identification. In contrast, both these perspectives suggest that who humans are as biological beings--including any images of themselves as social, empathetic beings- 48 Ibid., 51. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid., 71. 51 Ibid., 70. 52 For Despret, it is not that there is one way or a single approach that would allow us to see the world from an animal's perspective. In this respect, highlighting the body of the researcher is not the "answer" necessarily. "One may indeed construct a perspective without involving the body. The perspective may be drawn (perhaps only partially) solely from a mental process, as the naturalist and theorist of the Umwelt theory, Jakob Von Uexküll, did" Despret, ibid. 55. In terms of this dual process of unlearning in order to learn, we might also see analogies between approaches to unlearning in performance and those highlighted by ethologists like Shirley Strum who remarks of her efforts to think with baboons: "I made a determined effort to forget everything I knew about how baboons are supposed to behave. Instead, I tried to let the baboons themselves 'tell' me what was important" Strum, Almost Human (New York: Random House; 1987), 30, emphasis added.
-is underpinned by an already given mutuality, whether through communicating bodies or innate neurons.
<INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE> In ethological fieldwork, Despret argues, the ideal is still "that the animals may follow their routine as if the human observer was not there. One is the observer, the other the observed." 53 Fevered Sleep's Sheep Pig Goat, by contrast, draws attention to the animal as observer; or rather, to the reciprocity of observation in human-animal encounters, according to an expanded sense of the term "observation," the etymology of which signals not only acts of watching and looking, but also "heeding" or "attending to:" processes that might involve multiple sensory or affective modes.
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Indeed, given the variable numbers of bodies in the space of the encounters within Sheep Pig Goat (sometimes one dancer and two pigs; sometimes four goats and two musicians, plus the presence of the two co-directors, the audience), the network of observational processes is complex and multidirectional as humans and nonhuman animals conduct observations of one another. The etymology of observation also suggests links between what it is "to observe" and what it is "to keep safe" or "to protect", inviting consideration of attention as a form of care. For instance, at one moment, the older pig "looked out" for the younger, observing and vocally responding to the dancer who had 53 Ibid., 53. 54 As the film of the project emphasizes, the audience are not detached "observers" either, merely cognitively processing the encounters. Rather, we are part of the ongoing process of responsiveness -a source of stimulus for the animals (our sounds, smells) and they for us (laughter, disgust).
appeared to her to have come too close to them, to intrude on their space. This was a movement that mattered from the animal's point of view.
In Sheep Pig Goat, the performers aimed to set themselves up as the observed as well as the observers; though not always successfully or noticeably so, from a human point of view. That is, as
Butler suggested, the animals often did not seem that interested in looking at the performers;
although of course they may have been observing them -observing their observers -and responding to them in other ways. Or, to put it another way that recalls the terms of An Infinite Line, it is not that the animals were totally indifferent, so much as differently interested. concern with the politics and ethics of relationality that the company has hitherto explored in terms of human encounters across age and gender divides. Men & Girls Dance, in particular--a devised performance co-created by a group of professional male dancers and girls who dance for fun--could be seen as informing Sheep Pig Goat for a range of reasons. Both begin with an apparently unequal pairing: of the adult and the child, of the human and the nonhuman. Both projects create a contrast between the representational over-determination of that relationship and the unpredictability or creative potential of lived encounters involving individuals. In the case of Men & Girls Dance, the company framed the project as responsive to a media context in which they felt narratives of sexual abuse and exploitation had come to have not only a disproportionate, but damaging bearing on the ways in which men and girls might relate to each other. In the case of Sheep Pig Goat, there is less of an emphasis on a single determining story; rather, the individual words that were on the wall inside the gathering space within the warehouse, and reappear in the short film, point towards the myriad categories, stereotypes, and stories that might serve to organise our perception of nonhumans preventing the more creative and reciprocally determining forms of encounter I invoked at the start.
In Fevered Sleep's previous works, there is a notable effort to pursue a consistency of process and "product" (or form); or rather, the sense is that the politics of the work lies very much week: becoming "more to do with being together rather than dancing or playing or singing for.
'How can you leave a trail of scent for this pig with your breath?' rather than 'can you see if this sheep will watch you dance?'" 57 Is this the beginning of how the animal animalizes performance?
The performer is, still, performing for the animal, but in a context where performing no longer means "dancing or playing or singing" so much as leaving a trail of scent because her audience is a being who produces a world where smell means more than sound. Working towards a second iteration of the project, which will be held at the Vet School at the University of Surrey in the UK in 2020, one key difference in the company's approach might be a change in the "toolkit" they bring to the encounters. As David Harradine asks: "If pigs experience the world through scent and touch, what should we be bringing into the space to depart from that, rather than departing from our ideas of music and dance? If goats want to play with objects and to climb, how can we work with that?
What would a sheep, or a horse, or a cow, 'want' us to explore with them?" 58
Conclusions: Differential continuity in interspecies encounters
"Want" is in scare quotes above for fear of accusations of anthropomorphism in the attribution of agency and interests to nonhuman animals. Conventionally, anthropomorphism is something one is guilty of: perceived as a kind of stupidity or naïve way of thinking. As Lisa Jevbratt recounts, anthropomorphism is "a term uttered with disdain within both scientific and humanistic research communities. It is seen as error of sentimentality that makes (objective) research impossible." 59 However, it is important to reclaim the concept of anthropomorphism from such pejorative and reductive understandings that reinforce assumptions that there are exceptionally human characteristics in the first place. In contrast, more recent work in animal studies and new materialist discourse has sought to reclaim the value of a kind of expanded anthropomorphism that exposes the indeterminate notion of the human to a mutation by animal modes of thought, contra its default categorization as "error." In particular, John Mullarkey encourages thinking in terms of a distinction between the "half-anthropomorphism" of unilateral projection (which is usually understood to exhaust the concept per se) and a "complete anthropomorphism" of reciprocal mutation. 60 Taken up in the context of performance, the former refers to the application of a standard humanist form of performance to the animal without any change to the concept itself. In the latter, a multilateral and "complete anthropomorphism" expands the meaning of performance in the event of interspecies encounter. As Mullarkey suggests, this latter form of perception is not a "way of seeing" but "a lived, bodily stance:" a kind of behavioral openness to what performance might become rather than measuring the unknown according to extant (human) standards. 61 Likewise, the notion of interspecies empathy is by no means straightforwardly celebrated. It raises the charge (like empathy in general) of misguided identification and understanding and reinforcing an assumed capacity to access the minds of other animals or to adopt their viewpoints.
In To feel empathy is not anthropomorphic. It destabilises human exceptionalism in hugely important ways.
Such embodied challenges to human exceptionalism and the willingness to perceive continuities between humans and nonhuman animals remain key (contra what de Waal identifies as our tendency towards "anthropodenial") 65 : that is, the genuine practice of an equality for animals or the real inclusion of animals within the ethical sphere must be understood beyond the model of an expanding circle. In other words, there is a problem if empathy relies on analogy or identification; if we can only empathize with animals to the extent that we perceive them to be like "us": as proven to be capable of thought and emotion according to pre-existing human definitions of those properties.
Of course, empathy itself continues to be used to shore up human exceptionalism--despite countless counter-arguments seeking to demonstrate non-human instances of empathetic behavior.
As Cummings discusses, for many contemporary psychologists--as well as those cognitive neuroscientists who construe empathy as to some extent "innate" or "hard-wired"--"empathy is the path to our greatest potential humanity." 66 At the opening of this article I asked: What can performance contribute to our understanding and practice of an ethical approach to knowing nonhuman animals? What constitutes an ethical way of knowing nonhuman animals and how do we practice it? To conclude, I propose that, in the first instance, the ethical involves a kind of "epistemic justice," 68 acknowledging nonhuman animals as "knowers" and as living beings who performatively produce and inhabit a point of view that constitutes a sensory and perceptual form of worldly knowledge, as much as those produced by
humans. An ethical approach means confirming that animals have something to teach us about what knowledges are and how they are produced, rather than simply measuring animals according to any single standard of human knowledge. Secondly, an ethical mode of knowledge production involves the reciprocal and dialogic rather than the unilateral. If knowledge-making is forever in process and flux, then more ethical modes allow for multi-directional movement, rather than that which is imposed by some knowers onto others, or which erases the plurality of worldly knowledges by assimilating them into the category of "knowers" but without any qualitative change to the category itself.
Theatre and performance, especially in examples like Sheep Pig Goat, can be sites for intimate encounters with nonhuman animals that allow for new forms of interspecies communication. As Una Chaudhuri has argued, this might suggest that there is something special about performance in terms of forwarding our understanding of nonhuman animals. As an art focussed on embodied relationality, performance is particularly well equipped to explore non-verbal communication across the species barrier supposedly presented by animals' "lack" of language (or what has been construed as the human failure to sufficiently listen to and understand what nonhuman animals are already saying). 69 And indeed, embodiment has been a key emphasis in this article, particularly in terms of distinguishing between the reciprocity of embodied empathy in contrast to models of empathy based on unilateral projection and identification. However, the duality of the performative process is important to bear in mind in balancing the enthusiasm and optimism for performance's power to create and inhabit new modes of relation to nonhuman animals with a reminder of its equal power to reinforce speciesist norms in and through its bodily practices. That is, "the animal" is "just" an idea--but no less real and with no less material effects on both minoritized human and nonhuman bodies for being such. The superimposed words that affectively punctuate the Sheep Pig Goat film enumerate exactly the kinds of ideas that script dominant bodily engagements with animals, from the explicitly violent to the well-meaning (but perhaps no less problematic as condescending, self-serving, othering). Fevered Sleep's project productively draws attention to this duality of performance by suggesting that improvisational techniques from the human arts of dance and music might provide one way to undo some of the speciesist and anthropocentric assumptions that live differently in our bodies. arts and social performance, but as encompassing a continuum of everyday activities and perceptual practices that involve varying degrees of repetition and unlearning of "restored behaviors" with respect to encounters with nonhumans. The production of subjectivity is always an interspecies performance regardless of the extent to which its human participants might acknowledge it as such.
And yet, even this framing still only tells us one side of the story. To genuinely extend the field of performance to include nonhuman animals in meaningful qua transformative ways must also involve an openness to how bodies and ideas interact in and as forms of life where thinking, acting, and "point of view" take radically differing modalities than those afforded by the still humanist confines of the broad-spectrum.
<INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE> 
